At a Glance
- In Maria L. v. Mullin the District of Massachusetts stayed the June 27, 2025 interim final rule and all fines issued under it, pending further order of the court.
- The penalty statutes require a willful failure to depart. The court rejected, at this stage, treating continued presence after a removal order as automatic proof of willfulness.
- The plaintiffs were likely to succeed under the Administrative Procedure Act: the court rejected the government's reliance on exceptions to notice-and-comment rulemaking.
- The decision does not erase removal orders, confer status or remove Congress's authority to impose penalties in appropriate cases.
- Anyone who has received a civil immigration fine should get a legal review before paying, agreeing to a payment arrangement, ignoring the notice or deciding whether to depart.
A federal court in Massachusetts stayed the June 27, 2025 interim final rule for assessing civil immigration penalties and every fine issued under it. What the decision means for families in Mississippi and Louisiana, and what it does not change.
A federal district court has halted one of the most financially aggressive immigration-enforcement initiatives undertaken by the federal government in recent years: the large-scale assessment of civil penalties against noncitizens who remained in the United States following final orders of removal or expiration of voluntary departure periods.
In Maria L. v. Mullin, No. 1:25-cv-13471 (D. Mass.), U.S. District Judge George A. O’Toole Jr. stayed the federal government’s June 27, 2025 interim final rule governing the assessment of certain civil immigration penalties and all fines issued under that rule, pending further court order. The ruling has consequences extending well beyond Massachusetts and is particularly important for immigrant communities in Mississippi and Louisiana.[1]
The decision does not erase final orders of removal, confer lawful immigration status, or eliminate Congress’s underlying statutory authority to impose civil penalties in appropriate cases. It does, however, place an important limitation on the government’s ability to impose extraordinary financial penalties through a system that the court found likely inconsistent with federal immigration law and the Administrative Procedure Act.
An Enforcement Program Involving Billions of Dollars
Federal immigration law has long contained provisions authorizing penalties in certain circumstances when a person fails to depart the United States. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1324d, for example, the government may impose a civil penalty for a willful failure to depart following a final removal order. Section 1229c(d) similarly imposes consequences when a person voluntarily fails to depart within the period permitted under an order of voluntary departure.[2]
Those statutory qualifications matter. The law does not simply say that every person physically present in the United States after a removal deadline automatically owes hundreds of thousands, or millions, of dollars.
Beginning in 2025, however, DHS dramatically expanded its use of these penalty provisions. The challenged framework treated immigration records reflecting a removal order and continued presence as sufficient to infer willfulness or voluntariness. The 2025 inflation-adjusted daily maximum under § 1324d was $998; assessments calculated over years could approach $1.8 million for a single person.[3]
By July 2026, DHS reported issuing more than 103,000 fines totaling approximately $84 billion. These are the agency’s reported totals, distinct from the smaller figures cited in the court’s opinion.[4]
For immigrant families, many already confronting detention, removal proceedings, family separation, legal expenses, or uncertain employment, the consequences were potentially catastrophic.
The Court Rejects Automatic Assumptions of Willful Failure to Depart
One of the most important aspects of Maria L. is the court’s rejection, at this stage of the litigation, of a system that effectively substituted an automatic presumption for an individualized determination.[5]
A person may remain in the United States following a removal order for many reasons. An individual may have a pending motion to reopen, be pursuing adjustment of status or another immigration remedy, be complying with an ICE order of supervision, or have been unable to obtain a passport or travel document. Changed circumstances may support a request for humanitarian protection. Removal may have been temporarily stayed. Other factual or legal impediments may exist.
Those circumstances can be critically important when Congress expressly conditioned a penalty upon a willful or voluntary failure to depart. They require individual analysis; pursuing relief does not, by itself, establish lawful status, prevent removal, or defeat every possible fine.[6]
Judge O’Toole concluded that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed in showing that the government failed adequately to make the individualized determinations required by the governing statutes. Nancy M. illustrates the problem: she was assessed $1.82 million while present under an order of supervision and subsequently became a lawful permanent resident.[7]
That conclusion is significant because administrative efficiency cannot replace an element Congress placed in the statute.
The Administrative Procedure Act Matters
The second major component of the decision involves the Administrative Procedure Act, or APA. The APA governs how federal agencies create regulations and implement significant policy changes. Agencies ordinarily must provide public notice of substantive rulemaking and an opportunity for interested parties to comment before a new rule takes effect, subject to limited statutory exceptions.[8]
On June 27, 2025, DHS and DOJ issued an interim final rule designed to permit immigration penalties to be assessed more rapidly and on a vastly larger scale. The new system replaced procedures that had provided substantially greater protections. Under the previous framework, individuals received advance notice, generally had 30 days to contest a proposed penalty, could seek additional time for good cause, could request review, and had mechanisms for mitigation or remission. The new rule replaced advance notice with direct penalty decisions, shortened the response period, and restricted avenues for review.[9]
The federal court found that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their APA challenge. It rejected the government’s reliance on the foreign-affairs and procedural-rule exceptions to notice-and-comment requirements, explaining that important changes affected recipients’ substantive interests and their meaningful ability to contest ruinous penalties.[10]
This aspect of Maria L. is particularly important because immigration enforcement does not operate outside ordinary principles of administrative law. Congress may grant an agency substantial enforcement authority, but that authority remains subject to statutory limitations and legally required procedures. An agency cannot simply disregard those requirements because an abbreviated procedure would permit enforcement to occur faster.
AILG Had Already Successfully Challenged These Fines Under the APA
The reasoning in Maria L. also supports an approach Anderson Immigration Law Group has already used successfully on behalf of its own clients. Before this federal decision was issued, AILG had already succeeded in eliminating civil immigration fines by challenging the government’s assessments under the Administrative Procedure Act.
When the government issues an immigration-related financial assessment, the existence of a notice bearing the seal of a federal agency does not necessarily establish that the assessment was lawfully imposed. The analysis must include the statute authorizing the penalty, the regulations governing its assessment, the administrative procedures employed by the agency, the evidence supporting its factual conclusions, and the procedural protections afforded to the recipient.
The APA can therefore be an important component of immigration litigation strategy. Subject to applicable jurisdictional and review requirements, it provides a mechanism for federal courts to review agency action that is unlawful, procedurally defective, arbitrary and capricious, or inconsistent with governing statutes. Section 705 also permits interim judicial protection while that review proceeds.[11]
Maria L. reinforces precisely why that review matters.
The Human Consequences of Million-Dollar Immigration Fines
The significance of this decision cannot be measured only by the amount of money assessed. A civil penalty approaching $1 million or more can destabilize an entire household. Potential collection efforts can threaten wages, savings, tax refunds, vehicles, homes, credit, and the financial security of U.S.-citizen spouses and children. The court discussed these potential consequences and supplemental evidence of harm.[12]
The plaintiffs in Maria L. illustrated that reality. Maria L. reportedly received a penalty in the hundreds of thousands of dollars; Nancy M. was assessed more than $1.8 million. The court considered the resulting anxiety, health effects, risk of insolvency, and damage that eventual monetary relief might not repair. It concluded that the plaintiffs faced irreparable harm.[13]
There is also a broader concern. Immigration law provides mechanisms through which individuals with removal orders may, under appropriate circumstances, seek reopening, humanitarian protection, family-based immigration benefits, or other remedies. A penalty system must account for the statutory elements and the individual circumstances rather than treating every person pursuing relief as automatically subject to a fine.
A removal order and the availability of continuing legal remedies can exist simultaneously. Each case requires an individualized analysis.
What the Decision Does and Does Not Mean
The decision should not be interpreted as a ruling that civil immigration penalties can never be imposed. Congress has enacted statutory authority for certain penalties, and Maria L. does not erase those statutes. The government may seek appellate relief or attempt to implement a revised process consistent with statutory and administrative-law requirements.
The immediate importance of the decision is narrower but substantial: the June 27, 2025 regulatory framework and all fines issued under it have been stayed pending further court order. This is preliminary relief under APA § 705, rather than a final judgment permanently cancelling every assessment.[14]
The court recognized that staying the new procedure did not prevent the government from pursuing its broader immigration-enforcement objectives. The government could use procedures that governed these penalties before the challenged interim final rule. The opinion also recognized the possibility of later collection if penalties were ultimately enforceable.[15]
Individuals therefore should not assume that a removal order has disappeared, that every historical penalty has automatically been cancelled, or that correspondence from ICE may simply be ignored. The applicable assessment date, regulatory basis, and any later court orders must be examined. Each matter should be evaluated individually.
Similarly, filing a motion to reopen ordinarily does not automatically stay execution of removal. Whether a statutory or regulatory exception applies, or whether a separate stay is necessary, must be determined for the particular case.[16]
Particular Importance for Mississippi and Louisiana
The ruling is especially relevant in Mississippi and Louisiana, where Anderson Immigration Law Group represents individuals in removal proceedings, detention matters, federal habeas litigation, motions to reopen, post-order supervision, asylum and withholding cases, cancellation proceedings, and other forms of immigration relief.
AILG recommends reviewing matters involving final removal orders; orders of supervision; pending motions to reopen; pending or potential immigration relief; ICE civil-penalty notices; penalties issued under the June 27, 2025 regulations; and circumstances demonstrating that a client’s continued presence was not a willful refusal to comply with the law.
Affected individuals should preserve documentation concerning reporting to ICE, compliance with supervision conditions, applications and motions filed with agencies or federal courts, efforts to obtain travel documents, communications with foreign consulates, medical or humanitarian circumstances, and other evidence explaining why departure did not occur. These facts may become critical if the government attempts to reassess penalties through another procedure.[17]
A Broader Lesson About Immigration Enforcement
Maria L. v. Mullin represents more than a dispute over fines. It illustrates a fundamental principle of American administrative law: the federal government’s power to enforce immigration law is substantial, but it is not unlimited. Congress determines the legal prerequisites for imposing penalties. Administrative agencies must operate within those boundaries, comply with applicable APA requirements, and respect statutory elements even when individualized adjudication is slower than mass enforcement.[18]
For immigrant families facing enormous civil assessments, that distinction can mean the difference between financial survival and financial ruin. Anderson Immigration Law Group will continue evaluating civil immigration penalties through both immigration law and federal administrative law. Our prior success eliminating these assessments through APA challenges, together with the reasoning adopted in Maria L., demonstrates why these cases increasingly require counsel prepared to challenge unlawful federal agency action.
Individuals who have received a civil immigration fine, particularly following a final removal order or voluntary-departure order, should obtain a legal review before paying the assessment, entering a payment arrangement, disregarding the notice, or making decisions concerning departure from the United States.
- Maria L. v. Mullin, No. 25-13471-GAO, Opinion and Order at 1-2, 20, ECF No. 113; Order at 1-2, ECF No. 114 (D. Mass. Sept. 30, 2026). Opinion; stay order. Official source
- 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229c(d)(1), 1324d(a). See Maria L., Opinion and Order at 2-3.
- Imposition and Collection of Civil Penalties for Certain Immigration-Related Violations, 90 Fed. Reg. 27,439, 27,440 (June 27, 2025) (2025 inflation-adjusted daily maximum). Official rule. See also Maria L., Opinion and Order at 12-13. Official source
- DHS, DHS Announces More Than $84 Billion in Civil Fines Issued to Illegal Aliens (July 23, 2026), agency announcement; Nate Raymond, US Judge Blocks Trump Policy of Fining Migrants Up to $1.8 Million, Reuters (Oct. 6, 2026), report. These are agency-wide totals; the opinion separately cites more than 65,000 penalties totaling about $36 billion. Opinion and Order at 12 n.8. Official source
- Maria L., Opinion and Order at 10-13 (likelihood of success on individualized-assessment claim). Opinion. Official source
- Id. at 12-13 (circumstances relevant to statutory willfulness and voluntariness, including supervision and pursuit of immigration relief). A pending application or motion alone does not establish exemption from a penalty.
- Id. at 13 (Nancy M. was fined $1.82 million while under supervision and subsequently became a lawful permanent resident).
- 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)-(d); Maria L., Opinion and Order at 13-17. See statutory text. Official source
- 90 Fed. Reg. at 27,441, 27,449-50; Maria L., Opinion and Order at 6, 16-17. Official rule. Official source
- Maria L., Opinion and Order at 13-17 (rejecting claimed foreign-affairs and procedural-rule exceptions). Opinion. Official source
- 5 U.S.C. §§ 705, 706(2)(A), (C)-(D). See § 705 and § 706. Official source
- Maria L., Opinion and Order at 18-19 & n.9 (financial, health, credit, and family consequences). Opinion. Official source
- Id. at 18-19 (irreparable harm beyond ordinary monetary loss).
- Maria L., Order at 1-2, ECF No. 114 (staying the interim final rule and all fines issued under it pending further court order); 5 U.S.C. § 705. Stay order. Official source
- Maria L., Opinion and Order at 19-20 (government may use procedures predating the interim final rule; stayed penalties could be collected later if ultimately enforceable).
- 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(f), 1003.23(b)(1)(v) (motions to reopen or reconsider ordinarily do not stay execution of removal, subject to specific exceptions).
- Maria L., Opinion and Order at 10-13; 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229c(d)(1), 1324d(a). Documentation must be evaluated against the particular statutory violation alleged.
- Maria L., Opinion and Order at 10-17; 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (C)-(D). Opinion. Official source
This article provides general information regarding developments in U.S. immigration and administrative law as of October 8, 2026, and does not constitute legal advice regarding any individual case.
